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nomenal, then whoever takes pains to feed the child—or to feed himself, for that matter—is pottering at something a little less fruitful and dignified than a jig-saw puzzle.

Grant, though, that any and every biologist must read off his philosophy of the organism from the observed form and conduct of the organism itself, and grant, secondly, that any interpretation of life is at least a legitimate enterprise; then, as a matter of scientific method, you have dismissed forever all idealists from your councils. For you have agreed with the philosopher's clown, the dull man of common sense, that the vexations stirring all of us to action are the vexations we sense, perceive, reflect over and plan about, namely, situations in space and time; and that the changes we effect in our surroundings and in ourselves are really those which solve our problems. And, having gone this far, how in Heaven's name are you going to hold aloof from some variation of that much despised "copy theory" of knowledge? Even concede to the idealists all the noumena they yearn for,—noumenal egos and things in themselves; grant them too their ideals of God, freedom and immortality: still we can discern or conjecture these forces and aspirations only in so far as they are really at work in the world of space which we perceive; and, in this world, they have purport and are intelligible only to the extent that they are there confronted with real difficulties which are to be overcome only through real readjustments of position, form and movement. In other words, the Christian Scientist alone is entitled to say that the problems of the here and the there, the now and the tomorrow, are not real for the vital force, if such there be, which gives rise to consciousness. Everybody else, even the absolute idealist, must recognize that one must choose between no evolution at all and epistemological realism, at least so far as space is concerned.

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DISCUSSION

IRRATIONALISM AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM

PROFESSOR MONTAGUE, in his admirable criticism of Professor James's "irrationalism," writes as if that criticism were justifiable only from the point of view of the realist. A few verbal alterations, however, to statements all of which appear on page 149 of the article in the JOURNAL, will render that criticism just as valid for the absolute idealist. The *objective* idealist does not "admit that there are as many objects as there are witnesses,'' and that therefore ''if the world is objectively one system of facts'' there can be ''only one real self or witness—the absolute—of whom we finite selves are the mere appearances'': he does insist, however, that there is only one perfectly complete and accurate ''witness—the absolute,'' which as spiritual-world soul sums up and integrates the finite selves after a metaphysical manner, just as the Fechnerian physical-world soul is supposed to do after a psychological manner. The absolute, like the reading teacher, ''sees the letters and words which the child [the finite self] sees, but he sees also the sentence which the child does not see.'' His world is not a different world from that of the finite self, but the same world seen both ''collectively'' and ''distributively,'' and therefore completely instead of fragmentarily: for what is seen distributively only is thereby seen only fragmentarily, and *so far* falsely—just as every half-truth is *so far* error; but what is seen distributively *and* collectively is thereby seen in its wholeness. The distributive is not ''mere appearance'' and wholly false, and the collective the only reality, but it is the vision of things collectively that gives truth to what is lacking to the vision of them merely distributively. True, ''the experience of a whole is not numerically identical with the experience of its parts,'' but it *is* identical with the experience of the parts *plus* their wholeness. True again, ''the experience of a table as merely round and hard is not identical with the experience of it as old and valuable''; but the experience (as by the absolute, or any complete, all-round witness) of a table *qua* table (*i. e.,* in its wholeness) *is* identical with the experience of it as at once round, hard, old, valuable, and all the rest.

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SOCIETIES

SECTION OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

THE Section met at the American Museum of Natural History on November 22, 1909, at 8:15 P.M., in conjunction with the New York Branch of the American Psychological Association. The following papers were presented:

Some New Data on Fatigue: Professor EDWARD L. THORNDIKE.

Sixteen subjects worked from 300 to 700 minutes with no rest or only a short rest for luncheon. The work was the mental multiplication of three-place by three-place numbers. Each subject was